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Abstract: The goal of this article is dual: first, introducing a new model of accident named STAMP (systems-theoretic accident
modeling and processes); then applying the model to an innovative process for the treatment of contaminated substances and the
re-use of treated substances. This article is a demonstration for a need of a new tool to take into account hazards and safety within
socio-technical systems.
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1. Introduction
Processes for remediation (removal of pollution or
contaminants) of contaminated sediments have
become very efficient. These technologies, which are
particularly complex, call for a comprehensive
approach to risk analysis which characterises all
threats (to humans, equipment, local residents, the
environment etc.). The STAMP (systems-theoretic
accident model and processes) accident model is an
example of such a comprehensive approach, and it has
been chosen to characterise the risks associated with
Novosol®, an innovative remediation process. Risk
analysis is carried out through the application of
STPA (STamP-based Analysis).
This following presentation is organised into four
sections. The first describes the Novosol® process for
treating contaminated sediments. The second
introduces the STAMP accident model, together with
the associated technique STPA (which can be used
both to evaluate safety and to perform accident
analysis). The third section describes the concrete
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application of the STPA technique to the Novosol®
process. The fourth section is the conclusion.

2. The Problem of Contaminated Sediments
and the Novosol® Process
The natural environment is subject to many forms
of industrial, urban and agricultural waste, which
create a rich and diverse sediment contaminant.
Solvay SA began development of Novosol® in
partnership with the Université Libre de Bruxelles [1,
2] in 1993. It was initially developed to treat airborne
ash resulting from incineration. From 1999, it was
applied to the treatment of a wide range of
contaminated sediments.
Novosol® is divided into two stages [3]: a stage of
phosphatation, which aims to stabilize the heavy
metals present in the sediment, followed by a stage of
calcination, which destroys organic matter and
provides reusable materials.
This technology, which brings together many
stakeholders, creates a high level of risk which must be
controlled. Control is achieved through the application
of a risk analysis technique known as STPA. STPA is
based on the STAMP systemic accident model which
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advocates that the socio-technical system be considered
in its entirety [4, 5].

3. The STAMP Model and the STPA
Technique
STPA is based on the three concepts just described,
and can be used for safety assessments or accident
analysis. It is implemented in three main phases
described below:
 Phase 1: defines the safety requirements of the
system. It is divided into two sub-phases. The first
sub-phase defines requirements in terms of safety. The
second establishes the safety control structure, which
defines the roles and responsibilities of system
components, and aims to identify all interactions
between them;
 Phase 2: integrates the safety requirements of the
system, in the form of safety constraints, at each
hierarchical level in the structure;
 Phase 3: process models (control loops) are
formalised. This is in order to identify any weak
controls which may lead to the violation of a security
constraint, and consequently a state in which an
accident can occur. The controls and constraints
defined in Phase 2 are potentially subject to violations
arising from the process models and control loops
inherent at each level of the structure. Consequently,
the objective of this third phase is to determine at
which level of the process model, and where in the
control loop, there are weaknesses which may cause
the violation of a constraint. Constraint violations can
make the system shift towards a state where an
accident may happen.

4. Application of the STPA Technique to
Novosol®
Each of the stages of the STPA methodology is now
reviewed and applied to Novosol® [5]:
 Phase 3.1: definition of system requirements with
respect to safety and control structures
Using the STPA method, the requirements and the
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“system” constraints of Novosol® are defined in the
first sub-phase. Table 1 shows the requirements and
constraints for businesses currently using Novosol®
(comprising Solvay SA during development, and
currently SEDISOL and SIFA).
The cornerstone of this sub-phase is to define and to
establish the control structure for system safety, as
described by Leveson [6, 7]. Using the definition of
requirements and constraints from the first sub-phase,
a hierarchical control structure can be created (Fig. 1)
which includes a definition of the roles and
responsibilities of each component—in terms of both
control and feedback.
The analysis provides an overview of the system,
and highlights interactions between the hierarchical
levels.
Using
this
structure,
roles
and
responsibilities are integrated, and it becomes easier
to determine the influence components have on each
other. Establishing roles and responsibilities support
the following phase: the definition and integration
of constraints, at the level of each structural
component.
 Phase 3.2: integration of system requirements at
each level of the hierarchy, in the form of safety
constraints
This second phase depends on the first. It aims to
integrate requirements and safety constraints, with
respect to the various interactions between
components, at each hierarchical level. Requirements
are defined, and then applied (in the form of safety
constraints) to the interactions between components of
the safety control structure (identified in Phase 1).
Constraints must be analysed in detail. It is at this
point that inadequate constraints, which could play a
role in creating an accident, are identified.
The result of this analysis translates into the
definition of inadequate, or (in the framework of a
security assessment) potential control measures.
Inadequate controls are identified at each hierarchical
level, which correspond to the interactions identified
when the control structure was prepared (Table 2).
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Table 1

Examples of requirements definition and constraints for businesses operating Novosol®.

Business using Novosol® (SEDISOL or SIFA)
Safety requirements and constraints
Treatment of sediments contaminated by organic compounds and heavy metals
Responsible for the smooth conduct of inspections and preparation of reports on the use and development of Novosol® in
consultation with national and international bodies
Responsible for defining requirements and the operational performance of Novosol® with respect to national and international
regulations

Fig. 1 An analysis of novosol® using the stpa technique, the structure takes into account the development and operation of
novosol®, and shows the interactions between hierarchical levels [5, 8].
Table 2

Inadequate control mechanisms for businesses using Novosol®.

Business using Novosol® (SEDISOL or SIFA)
Potential or inadequate control measures
The operating company does not meet operational requirements for the safe use of Novosol®
The operating company is not able to meet the requirements of the company responsible for the development of Novosol®
The operating company does not provide inspection reports to overseeing agencies

Inadequate control mechanisms are translated into
constraints and safety requirements then integrated at
the level of the system component (Table 3).
Phase 3.3: Analysis of the process models (control
loops (Fig. 2)) to identify weaknesses in control that
could lead to the violation of a safety constraint and
therefore a state where an accident could occur
The constraints defined in Phase 2 can be violated,

and shift the system towards a dangerous state where
an accident may occur. The objective in Phase 3 is to
determine where in the control loop (or loops) a
weakness (or weaknesses) may surface, as it is these
weaknesses which lead to inadequate controls and
change the state of the system.
As an example, Fig. 3 describes the “maintenance
and evolution” control loop of the system.
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Table 3
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Potential constraints for businesses using Novosol®.

Business using Novosol® (SEDISOL or SIFA)
(Potential) constraints
The operating company must be able to meet safe operating requirements
The operating company must be able to meet the developmental requirements of Novosol®
The operating company must provide inspection reports to overseeing agencies

Fig. 2

Defects in the control loop, finding weaknesses in a control loop enables inadequate control actions to be identified.

Fig. 3 The “maintenance and evolution” control loop of Novosol®, this loop integrates the various components which
interact with the process model at a particular level, it highlights interactions at various hierarchical levels.
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5. Conclusions
The STPA technique, based on the STAMP model,
allows to consider a system throughout its life-cycle,
taking into account all possible interactions. It focuses

months in order to conduct research on the STAMP
model. The Complex Systems Research Laboratory is
headed by Professor Nancy Leveson who is
responsible for developing the STAMP model.

not on a chain of events, but on the problem of control
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